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Abstract 
Students need the support of financial aid to help them pay for college tuition and fees. 
One source of financial aid comes from scholarships. Universities are a primary source 
for scholarships. The University of Oklahoma Gallogly College of Engineering awards 
a number of scholarships to students each academic year. The committee who is 
responsible for the distribution of scholarships has to decide which student applicant 
receives a particular scholarship. This thesis focuses on how to optimize the matching 
of scholarships and students, taking into consideration the requirements of the 
scholarship and the credentials of students who are applying for the scholarship. This 
thesis approaches the process of matching students with scholarships in two ways. First, 
matching can be done from the scholarship side, which only considers the requirements 
of the scholarship and ranks the students based on how well they meet the scholarship 
requirements. Second, matching can be done from both sides, considering the 
requirements of the scholarship and the value of the award for the student. The 
matching results show that the first approach has a higher number of matching sets of 
scholarship and student. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The cost of attending higher education in the United States is increasing every 
year (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016). Students need the support of financial aid to 
help them pay for college tuition and fees (Snyder et al., 2016). One source of financial 
aid comes from scholarships. Scholarships can be merit-based or need-based. 
Universities are a primary source for scholarships, often through gifts from alumni and 
friends. 
The University of Oklahoma Gallogly College of Engineering (GCoE) awards a 
number of scholarships to students each academic year. The GCoE manages the 
distribution of scholarships for engineering students. The committee who is responsible 
for the distribution of scholarships has to decide which student applicant receives a 
particular scholarship. Given that each scholarship has specific criteria, defined at the 
discretion of the donor, the matching of students to scholarships is not easily 
accomplished. Currently, the process is done manually and can take the team two to 
three days to accomplish. 
This thesis focuses on how to optimize the matching of scholarships and 
students, taking into consideration the requirements of the scholarship and the 
credentials of students who are applying for the scholarship. The process of matching 
students with scholarships can be approached in two ways with different objectives in 
mind. First, matching can be done from the scholarship side, which only considers the 
requirements of the scholarship and ranks the students based on how well they meet the 
scholarship requirements. The objective of this approach is to maximize the number of 
scholarships awarded to students. Second, matching can be done from both sides, 
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considering the requirements of the scholarship and the value of the award for the 
student. The objective of this approach is to maximize the value of the scholarship 
award for the student given that the student meets the scholarship requirements. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains background on the 
concepts related to this work, including bipartite graph, network flow, and stable 
matching. In Chapter 3, the methodology for the work is presented, which includes the 
methods to prepare the dataset and the approaches for the matching process. Chapter 4 
describes the results and the evaluation of the results. The conclusion of the work is 
















Chapter 2: Background 
A matching problem involves a set of participants, in which each participant has 
a certain capacity and a subset of the participants have preference over other 
participants. The definition of matching in this context is the attempt to assign each 
participant to one or more qualified participant(s) based on the preferences of the 
participants, without exceeding the capacity of the participants (Sng, 2008). 
There are several problems in the real-world which can be classified as a 
matching problem. A popular one is assigning graduate medical students to hospital 
posts (Irving, 1998; Roth & Peranson, 1999). In the United States, it is known as 
National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Another matching problem can be 
found in the implementation of assigning schools to students (Abdulkadiroglu & 
Sönmez, 2003; Aksoy et al., 2013). Two cities in the United States which applied such a 
centralized matching system are New York (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005) 
and Boston (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, & Sönmez, 2005). Another application of 
the matching concept is used for the system in managing the kidney exchange (Roth, 
Sönmez, & Ünver, 2004). The matching concept is also used to allocate students to 
courses (Diebold, Aziz, Bichler, Matthes, & Schneider, 2014) and projects (Abraham, 
Irving, & Manlove, 2003; Manlove & O'Malley, 2008) 
There are several ways to classify the matching problem. The most distinct one 
would be bipartite and non-bipartite matching. A bipartite matching is when the 
participants can be divided into two disjoint sets (Sng, 2008), while in a non-bipartite 
model the participants are a single set. Several applications  mentioned above (e.g., 
assigning graduate medical students to hospital posts, assigning schools to students, and 
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allocating students to course) are bipartite matching, whereas the example for the non-
bipartite model can be found in the assigning roommates problem (Irving, 1985). 
Furthermore, the matching problem can be divided based on the types of preferences list 
which are involved (one-sided or two-sided) and the types of mapping to assign the 
members from one side to the other (one-to-one and one-to-many). 
The matching between scholarship and students in this thesis can be considered 
as a bipartite matching (it involves two disjoint set, scholarship, and student) with one-
to-many mapping (each scholarship has a capacity for a number of students). We 
approach the matching between scholarships and students with one-sided preference 
(scholarship) and two-sided preference (scholarship and student). 
This chapter presents the background concept for the matching problem. Section 
2.1 describes the bipartite matching in graph theory, section 2.2 describes the flow in a 
network, and section 2.3 described the Stable Marriage Problem and Hospital-Resident 
problem. 
2.1 Matching in a Graph 
A graph G (V, E) is a pair of sets, consisting of a set of vertices V = {v1, v2, v3, 
…, vn} and a set of edges E = {e1, e2, e3, …, ep}; each edge has two endpoints which 
are members of V (Diestel, 2005; Even, 2011). Any two nodes connected by an edge 
are said to be adjacent. A bipartite graph is a graph where its vertices can be separated 
into two disjoint sets, and the vertices in the same class cannot be adjacent (Diestel, 
2005). The bipartite graph can be represented as graph G (X, Y, E) with X = {x1, x2, x3, 
…, xn}, Y = {y1, y2, y3, …, ym}, and E = {e1, e2, e3, …, ep} which V = X ∪ Y is the set 
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of vertices and E is the set of edges which each edge has one vertex in X and one in Y 
(Tanimoto, Itai, & Rodeh, 1978). Figure 1 shows an example of a bipartite graph. 
 
Figure 1: An example of bipartite graph 
Matching in a bipartite graph G is a set of edges, M, where M is a subset of E 
such that no two edges in M share common vertices. An edge e = (x, y) ∈ E, where x ∈ 
X and y ∈ Y, is matched when e ∈ M, otherwise e is unmatched. 
The size or cardinality of the matching, denoted by |M|, is the number of edges 
in M. A matching M is said to be maximal when M is not a proper subset of any other 
matching in G. A matching M is said to be maximum when M has the largest number of 
edges. A maximum matching is a maximal one, but not always the other way around. 
We can use a network flow technique to find a maximum matching in a bipartite graph 
(Even, 2011). 
2.2 Network Flow 
A directed graph N (V, E) is a network if V contains a source vertex, s, and sink 
vertex, t (where indegree(s) = outdegree(t) = 0); every edge e = (x, y) has non-negative 
capacity u (x, y) ≥ 0; and every vertex lies on the path between s and t (Abraham, 2003). 
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A flow function in N is an assignment of a real number f(e) to each edge e with 
the following conditions (Even, 2011): 
• For every edge e ∈ E, 0 ≤ f(e) ≤ u(e) 
• For every vertex x ∈ V except {s, t}, the input flow of x is equal to the 
output flow of x. 
The size of the flow is the total flow, which is the net sum of flow into the sink 
(Even, 2011). Given a flow network N, the maximum flow problem is to find the 
maximum size of flow in N (Ahuja, Magnanti, & Orlin, 1993). Ahuja et al. (1993) 
describe several algorithms to solve the maximum flow problem. 
The bipartite matching can be modeled as network flow (Even, 2011). Let G (X, 
Y, E) be a bipartite graph shown in Figure 1, where each vertex x has capacity b(x) ≥ 1. 
We can find the maximum matching for the bipartite graph in Figure 1 by turning the 
bipartite graph into a network flow. The network flow N is constructed with one vertex 
for each x ∈ X and one vertex for each y ∈ Y. An edge (x, y) with capacity one is added 
whenever (x, y) ∈ G. Edges (s, x) from s to each vertex x with capacity b(x), and edges 
(y, t) for each vertex y to sink t with capacity one are also added. Figure 2 shows the 
network flow for the bipartite graph in Figure 1. Let f be the maximum flow of N, f is 
the maximum matching for a bipartite graph G (Even, 2011). 
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Figure 2: Network flow for bipartite graph in Figure 1 
Let each edge e ∈ N be associated with cost c, where c(e) ≥ 0. The cost of the 
flow is the sum of the cost of the flow in each edge. Ahuja et al. (1993) describe several 
approaches to find the maximum flow minimum cost of N. 
2.3 Stable Matching 
A stable matching problem consists of a set of participants, each of whom has 
preference list ranking over a subset of other participants which they want to be paired 
up with. The problem is to produce a matching M of the participants such that no two 
participants prefer each other to their assignment in M. 
Stable marriage problem is a stable matching problem with one-to-one mapping, 
whereas the hospital-resident matching problem is a stable matching problem with one-
to-many mapping (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). 
2.3.1 Stable Marriage Problem 
An instance I of the Stable Marriage problem (SM) consists of two disjoint sets, 
men, U, and women, W, with |U|= |W| = n. Each person p in U ∪ W has preference list 
8 
over the person on the other set, each man has preference over all women and each 
woman has preference over all men (Iwama & Miyazaki, 2008). This preference list is 
strictly ordered. 
An assignment in M is a subset of U×W such that (m, w) ∈ M only if m and w 
find each other acceptable. If (m, w) ∈ M, we say that m is assigned to w and w is 
assigned to m. A matching is an assignment M such that each man is assigned to at most 
one woman in M, and each woman is assigned to at most one man in M. If (m, w) ∈ M, 
we say that m is matched to w and w is matched to m. We can denote w as M(m) and m 
as M(w). A blocking pair is a pair of man and woman (m, w) where m prefers w to 
M(m) and w prefers m to M(w). A matching is said to be stable if it admits no blocking 
pairs (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). 
SM can be solved with the deferred acceptance algorithm, widely known as the 
Gale-Shapley Algorithm (Gale & Shapley, 1962). The algorithm involves several 
iterations of “proposal” from one set (men) to the other set (women) or the other way 
around, from women to men. Figure 3 (Gusfield & Irving, 1989) shows the basic Gale-
Shapley algorithm when the men are proposing. 
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Figure 3: Basic Gale-Shapley Algorithm (Gusfield & Irving, 1989) 
The algorithm always finds a stable matching for an instance of SM (Gale & 
Shapley, 1962). If the men are the proposer, the algorithm is known as man-oriented. 
Otherwise, it is known as woman-oriented. The algorithm involves nondeterminism 
because the order in which the proposer proposes is of no consequence to the result 
(Gusfield & Irving, 1989). 
The man-oriented algorithm gives the man-optimal matching result where each 
man has the best partner that he can have in any stable matching, while the woman-
oriented algorithm gives the woman-optimal matching result where each woman gets 
the best partner she can have in any stable matching (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). The 
man-optimal is also woman-pessimal because each woman gets the worst partner she 
can have on any stable matching (McVitie & Wilson, 1971), whereas the woman-
optimal is the man-pessimal. 
There are several variations of Stable Marriage Problem. These variations relate 
to the conditions of the preference list. 
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2.3.1.1 Incomplete List 
SMI (Stable Marriage with Incomplete List) is a variant of the SM where each 
person need not include all the members of the opposite set in the preference list 
(Iwama & Miyazaki, 2008). The preference list of person p only includes the member of 
the opposite set which person p finds acceptable. A person p considers a person q 
acceptable if and only if q is on the preference list of p. 
A man m and woman w are assigned to each other in a matching M only if m 
and w are acceptable to one another. Thus, the matching need not be complete, because 
not all the members of either set need to be assigned. A blocking pair is a pair of man 
and woman (m, w) where: 
• m and w find each other acceptable 
• either m is unassigned in M, or m prefers w to M(m) 
• either w is unassigned in M, or w prefers m to M(w) 
A matching in SMI is said to be stable if it admits no blocking pair. Every 
instance of SMI admits a stable matching (Gale & Shapley, 1962). The extended 
version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be used to find a stable matching in any 
instances of SMI (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). For any matching M in an instance of SMI, 
some persons may be unassigned in M, but the same persons are unassigned in all stable 
matching. Therefore, the cardinality of all stable matching for an instance of SMI is the 
same (Gale & Sotomayor, 1985). 
2.3.1.2 Ties 
SMT is a variant of the SM where the preference list of each person includes all 
the members of the opposite set but can contain ties (i.e., several persons can have the 
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same rank) (Iwama & Miyazaki, 2008). A person p is said to be indifferent to persons q 
and r if q and r appear in a tie in the preference list of p. The existence of ties introduces 
three definitions of stability for a matching, namely weakly, strong, and super stability 
(Irving, 1994). 
A matching M is weakly stable if there is not any blocking pair (m, w) where m 
and w prefer each other to their assigned partner in M. A weakly stable matching can 
always be found for any instance of SMT by breaking ties arbitrarily and applying the 
Gale-Shapley algorithm. This method produces weakly stable matching for any instance 
of SMT (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). 
A matching M is strongly stable if it admits no blocking pair (m, w) such that 
either: 
• m prefers w to M(m), and either w prefers m to M(w) or is indifferent 
between them 
• w prefers m to M(w) and either m prefers w to M(m) or is indifferent 
between them. 
Strongly stable matching need not exist for a given instance of SMT. There is an 
algorithm to check whether a given instance has a strongly stable matching, and to find 
one if one exists (Irving, 1994). 
A matching M is super stable if it admits no blocking pair (m, w) such that: 
• m either prefers w to M(m) or is indifferent between them, or 
• w either prefers m to M(w) or is indifferent between them. 
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Super stable matching need not exist for a given instance of SMT. There is an 
algorithm to check whether a given instance has a super stable matching, and to find 
one if there exist (Irving, 1994). 
2.3.1.3 Incomplete List and Ties 
The variant of stable matching with incomplete list and ties is the combination 
of the two previous variants; we denote this problem as SMTI (Stable Marriage with 
ties and incomplete list). SMTI has an incomplete preference list which can contain ties 
(Iwama & Miyazaki, 2008). The notion of stability in SMTI consists of weakly, strong, 
and super stable. A weakly stable matching can be found with the same method as in 
SMT. The result of weakly stable matching can have different cardinality. The problem 
to find the maximum cardinality for weakly stable matching in SMTI is NP-Hard 
(Manlove, Irving, Iwama, Miyazaki, & Morita, 2002). 
2.3.2 Hospital-Resident Matching 
An instance I of the Hospital-Resident problem (HR) consists of two disjoint 
sets of hospitals H and residents R. Each resident r has a preference list which ranks a 
subset of H in strict order. Each hospital h has a preference list which ranks in strict 
order the residents who ranked h in their preference list. We say r and h are acceptable 
to each other if they rank each other on their preference list. Each hospital h has a 
capacity of c which is the maximum number of residents that can be assigned to h 
(Gusfield & Irving, 1989; Iwama & Miyazaki, 2008). 
An assignment M is a subset of H × R such that (h, r) ∈ M, implies that h and r 
find each other acceptable. If (h, r) ∈ M, we can say that h is assigned to r and r is 
assigned to h. For each hospital h ∈ H, M(h) denotes the set of residents assigned to h in 
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M. h is said to be fully subscribed in M if |M(h)|=c and undersubscribed in M if 
|M(h)|<c. A matching M is an assignment where each resident is assigned to at most one 
hospital, and each hospital is assigned to at most c residents. 
A matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair (h, r) such that: 
• h and r find each other acceptable, 
• either r is unassigned in M or r prefers h to M(r), and 
• either h is undersubscribed, or h prefers r to the worst assigned resident 
in M(h) 
Every instance of HR admits a stable matching (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). The 
algorithm for SM can be extended for HR. The definition of man-optimal and woman-
optimal can be extended to hospital-optimal and resident-optimal respectively. Figure 4 
shows the algorithm for the hospital-oriented, while Figure 5 shows the algorithm for 
resident-oriented (Gusfield & Irving, 1989). 
 




Figure 5: Resident-oriented algorithm (Gusfield & Irving, 1989) 
A Hospital-Resident problem with ties (HRT) is the variant of HR where the 
preference of hospital and resident may contain ties. The definition of stability is similar 
to the definition of stability for SMTI. To find a weakly stable matching in an instance 
of HRT, the method to find a weakly stable matching in SMTI can be applied. Similar 








Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology. I describe data preparation in section 
3.1, the matching process in section 3.2, and the method to optimize the matching in 
section 3.3. 
3.1 Data Preparation 
The data for this research consists of scholarship criteria data and student 
attribute data. The data need to undergo preparation before the matching process. The 
data preparation consists of two independent processes, scholarship data preparation 
and student data extraction. The results are exported into a database at the end of each 
process. The database management system used in this research is MySQL. 
3.1.1 Scholarship Data Preparation 
Scholarship criteria data come from the agreement documents between donors 
and the Gallogly College of Engineering. The scholarship committee summarized the 
contents of the agreement documents into an Excel file. The scholarship data in the file 
consists of account number (identity of the scholarship), name, criteria (which must be 
satisfied by awardee characteristics), and preferences (preferred awardee characteristics) 
of the scholarships. Each scholarship has different criteria and preferences. We refer to 
the constraints and preferences as the scholarship requirements. These requirements are 
translated into attributes. Figure 6 represents the above description. 
 
Figure 6: Mapping between requirements and attributes of scholarship 
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In addition to the agreement documents, the scholarship data has another source 
saved in an excel file. The data contain the total dollar amount available in each 
account. Through predetermined allocation amounts, the number of awards can be 
estimated. The committee also has a priority for the scholarships (which scholarship 
should be assigned first to students). At the end of this preparation process, the data for 
account, name, criteria, preferences, the total amount, the number of scholarship, and 
priority of the scholarship are stored in a database. 
3.1.2 Student Data Extraction 
Student data for the matching process come from a scholarship applicant report. 
The data are stored in an Excel file. The data consist of multiple attributes for each 
student. A process of extraction selects each student’s identity attributes and several 
attributes which are of relevance to the attributes of scholarship. Figure 7 illustrates the 
description. The list of the attributes is in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 7: Mapping between student’s attributes and scholarship’s attributes 
 
17 
The process not only extracts student’s attributes which are relevant to the 
scholarship’s attributes, but also specific attributes of the students which are needed in 
the filtering process. The filtering process is a sub-process of the matching process 
which is explained in the next section. The result of the student data extraction process 
is exported into the same database as the scholarship data. 
3.1.3 Dataset for Testing 
 The scholarship data for this research are a subset of the full scholarship data. 
After the exclusion of several unnecessary attributes, there are 18 attributes used for the 
matching process. The list of the attributes for this research is in Appendix A, while the 
list of excluded attributes is in Appendix B. There are 95 scholarships, with the total 
award of 333 awards, related to those attributes.  
The student data for this research consist of 923 students. There are missing 
values in the student data. The missing values are caused by students who did not 
provide information. The missing values in the student data are treated as empty values 
(NULL) in the matching process. For the numeric attributes, such as Gross Financial 
Need and Grade Point Average, the missing values are considered as 0 value. Three 
different students datasets were generated from subsets of the student data and are used 
to test the matching process. Table 1 shows the different student datasets for testing. 
Table 1: The student dataset for testing 
Name of dataset Number of students Filter 
full 923 0 
sample 1 500 GPA > 2 
sample 2 500 GPA > 2 
 The first dataset (full) is the full dataset of students with no filter. The second 
dataset (sample 1) contains 500 randomly selected students from the full dataset. The 
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third dataset (sample 2) contains a different 500 randomly selected students from the 
full dataset. For the second and third datasets, students with GPAs less than or equal to 
two are filtered out in the matching process (the detail for the filtering process is in 
section 3.2.2). 
3.2 Matching Process 
The matching process consists of several sub-processes. The sub-processes are 
initial matching, filtering, ranking, and optimized matching. We can see the sequence of 
the process in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Sequence of the sub-processes in matching process 
The scholarship-student matching process in this research uses several 
assumptions. Those assumptions are as follow: 
1. One student is assigned to at most one scholarship. 
2. The amount of award the student receives for a particular scholarship is 
the same for all students who receive that particular scholarship. 
3. The following formula calculates the number of allocated award for a 
scholarship: 




where ai is the amount of award given to the student, ⌊𝐴𝑖⌋ is the total 
amount of award rounding down to the nearest thousands dollar value, 
and pi is the number of award allocated to students for scholarship si 
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4. The students prefer scholarships which give a higher award (higher 
amount of dollar value) and those scholarships that give a higher number 
of awards. 
5. The ranking process for student and scholarship is strictly ordered. 
6. The committee has a set of priorities for the scholarships. The 
scholarships are assigned to students based on these priorities. 
The matching process for an instance I of the scholarship-student matching 
involves a set of n scholarship S = {s1, s2, …, sn} and a set of m students T = {t1, t2, …, 
tm) and is described in the following sections: 3.2.1 describes the initial matching, 3.2.2 
describes the filtering, 3.2.3 describes the ranking, and 3.2.4 describes the optimized 
matching. 
3.2.1 Initial Matching 
After the data are stored in a database, we can begin the initial matching process. 
The initial matching selects subsets of students who qualify for each scholarship based 
on the criteria and preferences of the scholarship. Because each scholarship has 
different criteria and preferences, the subset of students who qualify can differ from one 
another. A student can qualify for several scholarships. Therefore, there are overlaps 
between the subsets of students for the scholarships. 
For an instance I, with a set of scholarships S and a set of students T, the initial 
matching selects students who qualified for scholarship si. Student tj is qualified for si if 
tj fulfills all the criteria of si. The number of preferences of si which tj fulfills is counted 
and used in the ranking process. Di is the subset of students who qualify for scholarship 
si, and Hj is the subset of scholarships for which student tj is qualified. Each scholarship 
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has a capacity constraint p, with pi being the number of allocated awards for scholarship 
si. 
3.2.2 Filtering 
This process removes several students from the set of students in the initial 
matching. There are two types of filters. The mass filter is the filter based on certain 
values of the students’ attributes. This filter removes several students at once who have 
the defined value in the filter. The other filter, the individual filter, removes students 
based on an individual student’s identity. There are several reasons for filtering out the 
students, e.g. the students are national merit scholars who are not eligible for additional 
awards, the students already received other scholarships, or the students have a missing 
value in their GPA. The filtering of individual students happens when the committee 
determines that a student is ineligible to receive a scholarship. The subsequent process, 
ranking, does not consider filtered students.  
3.2.3 Ranking 
To determine the final match between student and scholarship, the ranking 
process ranks the students matched to each scholarship and ranks the scholarships 
matched to each student. The students are ranked based on attributes of Gross Financial 
Need (GFN) and Grade Point Average (GPA), as requested by the scholarship 
committee. The students are ranked based on their GFN (primary rank), then their GPA 
(secondary rank). The scholarships for each student are ranked by the amount of award, 
the number of awards of the scholarship, and the priority of scholarship. The ranking 
process for the scholarships for each student is based on the assumptions that students 
prefer scholarships which give a higher amount of dollar value and higher number of 
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awards (where the students have higher possibility to get the award). The priority of the 
scholarship from the committee is used as the tie-breaker to avoid ties in the student 
ranking process. 
For the instance I, with a set of scholarships S and a set of students T, the 
ranking process ranks the students in the set of Di for scholarship si (from 1 to |𝐷𝑖|), 
where 𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑡𝑗) is the rank of tj in Di. The ranking process also ranks the scholarship in the 
set of Hj for student tj (from 1 to |𝐻𝑗|), with 𝑟𝑡𝑗(𝑠𝑖) is the rank of si in Hj. 
The results of the ranking process are sets of strictly ordered ranks of students 
for each scholarship and sets of strictly ordered ranks of scholarships for each student. 
3.2.4 Optimized Matching 
This process matches scholarships with students. A scholarship can be matched 
to several students (based on the number of the awards the scholarship can give). A 
student can only be awarded at most one scholarship. 
For the instance I, with a set of S scholarships and a set of T students, an 
assignment M is a subset of 𝑆 ×  𝑃 such that (si, tj) ∈ M, implies that tj ∈ Di. If (si, tj) ∈ 
M, we can say that si is assigned to tj and tj is assigned to si. For each scholarship si ∈ S, 
M(si) denotes the set of students assigned to si in M. For each student tj ∈ T, M(tj) 
denotes the set of scholarship assigned to tj in M. 
A matching M is an assignment that satisfying the following conditions: 
1. For each si ∈ S, |𝑀(𝑠𝑖)|  ≤ 𝑑𝑖, and 
2. For each tj ∈ T, |𝑀(𝑡𝑗)|  ≤ 1. 
To find the optimal matching, we apply two approaches. The approaches are 
One-Sided Matching and Two-Sided Matching. 
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3.3 Methods for Optimized Matching 
The scholarship-student matching can be modeled as bipartite matching. It can 
be represented by bipartite graph G (S, T, E), where S is the vertices that represent the 
set of scholarships and T is the vertices that represent the set of students. I apply two 
approaches to optimize the matching process, a one-sided match and a two-sided match. 
To further explain the two approaches, we use an example instance of the Scholarship-
Student Matching with a set of scholarships S = {s1, s2, s3} and a set of students T = {t1, 
t2, t3, t4, t5}. Figure 9 shows the bipartite graph for the above instance. 
 
Figure 9: Bipartite graph for an instance of scholarship-student matching problem 
3.3.1 One-Sided Matching 
This approach considers the preferences of the scholarships over students, which 
represented by the ranking of students in each scholarship. The objective of this 
approach is to maximize the number of matches between scholarships and students with 
the students having the highest rank receiving the awards. This approach can be 
formulated as a network flow problem, where the flow of the network is the possible 
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assignment of scholarships to students. Figure 10 shows the network flow model for the 
example instance. 
 
Figure 10: The network flow model for the example instance 
The network is created from the bipartite graph in Figure 10 with the addition of 
two vertices {s, t}, where s is the source and t is the sink. Each scholarship and student 
is represented as a vertex. Directed edges connect source to each scholarship and each 
scholarship to the qualified students. Directed edges are added from each student to 
sink. Each edge has a capacity and a cost. All the edges have a capacity, with the lower 
bound value of zero, and the upper bound of one. However, the edges from source to 
scholarship have different upper bounds for the capacity. For the edge from source to 
scholarship si, it has the upper bound capacity value of pi (the number of awards 
allocated for scholarship si). The cost for the edges from source to scholarship is the 
priority of the scholarship. For the edge from scholarship si to student tj, the cost is 
𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑡𝑗), which is the rank for student tj in scholarship si. While the cost for the edges 
from all students to sink is zero. 
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This problem can be considered as maximum flow minimum cost because we 
want to maximize the number of awards from scholarships that can be given (flow) and 
minimize the sum of the rankings of students who received scholarships (cost). In this 
research, the one-sided matching approach is solved with the help of NetworkX 
package in Python (Hagberg, Swart, & S Chult, 2008). 
Table 2 shows the priority, the number of awards, and the list of qualified 
students for each scholarship for the example instance we defined above. The ranking 
for each student on the list of qualified students is inside the parenthesis. 
Table 2: Scholarship data for the example instance 
Scholarship Priority Number of awards Qualified students 
s1 1 2 t1 (1), t2 (2), t4 (3) 
s2 2 1 t2 (1), t5 (2) 
s3 3 1 t1 (1), t3 (2), t5 (3) 
Figure 11 shows the network from the example instance defined above with the upper 
bound capacity and cost for each edge based on the data from Table 1. 
 
Figure 11: The network for the example instance with capacity and cost for each 
edge 
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The results for the example instance solved with maximum flow minimum cost 
is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: The maximum flow with minimum cost for the example instance 
The edges in green show the flow in the network. The maximum flow for 
example instance is 4 (because the total allocated award from the scholarships is 4), 
while the minimum cost from the maximum flow is 14. The minimum cost is the sum of 
the result from multiplying the cost and the capacity for the green color edges. The 
matching result for the example instance is in Table 3. 
Table 3: The matching result for the example instance for one-sided matching 
Scholarship Number of awards Assigned students 
s1 2 t1, t2 
s2 1 t5 
s3 1 t3 
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3.3.2 Two-Sided Matching 
This approach considers the preferences of both sides, the scholarships and the 
students. The preferences of scholarships over students are represented by the ranking 
of students for each scholarship, while the preferences of students over scholarships are 
represented by the ranking of scholarship for each student. The objective of this 
approach is to maximize the value of the scholarship award for the student given that 
the student meets the scholarship requirements. This approach can be formulated as a 
one-to-many stable matching problem. 
A matching between scholarship and student is stable when there are no 
blocking pairs. For the instance I, with a set of scholarships S and a set of students T, a 
blocking pair is an assignment of (si, tj) which is not a subset of M, where: 
1. tj is in Di, means that student tj is qualified for scholarship si 
2. either tj is unmatched, or 𝑟𝑡𝑗 (𝑀(𝑡𝑗)) is lower than 𝑟𝑡𝑗(𝑠𝑖), means that 
student tj is unmatched in matching M, or student tj is matched, but the 
ranking of M(tj) – which is the scholarship assigned to student tj is lower 
than scholarship si.  
3. either si is undersubscribed in M or the lowest of 𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑀(𝑠𝑖)) is lower 
than 𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑡𝑗), means that the awards for scholarship si are not fully 
assigned to students or the lowest ranking of students assigned to 
scholarship si in matching M is lower than student tj. 
This scholarship-student matching is a variant of a Hospital-Resident (HR) 
problem. Like HR, there are two algorithms based on which set’s ranking is considered 
first, the scholarship-oriented or the student-oriented.  
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For the student-oriented algorithm, the students apply for the scholarship in their 
list based on the ranking of the scholarships for each student. The steps for matching are 
described as follow: 
1. At the start of the algorithm, all students and scholarships are free.  
2. The students are assigned to the scholarship based on the rank of the 
scholarships matched to the students.  
3. If there is an unallocated award in a scholarship, the scholarship is 
awarded to the student with the highest rank. If the award has been 
assigned, but there is another student who has higher rank on the 
scholarship list, the award is re-allocated to a higher rank student. The 
previous student is un-assigned to the scholarship. 
4. Step (2) and (3) are repeated until all scholarship awards are allocated or 
there are no students remaining which meet the requirements for the 
scholarship. 
For the scholarship-optimal match, the scholarships assign the students in their 
list based on the ranking of the students in each scholarship. The steps for matching 
describe as follow: 
1. At the start of the algorithm, all students and scholarships are free.  
2. The scholarships are assigned to the students based on the rank of the 
students matched to the scholarship.  
3. If the students have not been allocated a scholarship, the student accepts 
the scholarship with the highest rank on the student’s list. If the students 
are assigned to another scholarship that has a higher rank on the 
28 
student’s list, the student accepts the new scholarship. The previous 
scholarship is un-assigned to the student. 
4. Step (2) and (3) are repeated until all scholarship awards are allocated or 
there are no students remaining which meet the requirements for the 
scholarship. 
For the example instance defined at the beginning of the section 3.3, Table 4 
shows the number of awards and the ranking of students for each scholarship, and Table 
5 shows the ranking of scholarships for each student. The ranking is inside the 
parenthesis. The result of the matching with the two-sided approach is shown in Table 
6. 
Table 4: The number of awards and the ranking of students for each scholarship 
Scholarship Number of awards Qualified students 
s1 2 t1 (1), t2 (2), t4 (3) 
s2 1 t2 (1), t5 (2) 
s3 1 t1 (1), t3 (2), t5 (3) 
 
Table 5: The ranking of scholarships for each student 
Student Scholarship 
t1 s1 (1), s3 (2) 
t2 s1 (1), s2 (2) 
t3 s3 (1) 
t4 s1 (1) 
t5 s2 (1), s3 (2) 
 




s1 t1, t2 t1, t2 
s2 t5 t5 
s3 t3 t3 
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 For the example instance, the matching result for the student-oriented and the 
scholarship-oriented are identical. This can happen, but this will not, in general, be the 




















Chapter 4: Result 
The approaches described in the previous chapter are tested with a dataset 
consisting of 95 scholarship funds with 333 total allocated awards and 923 student 
applicants. The detailed description of the dataset is in chapter 3 section 3.1.3. This 
chapter describes the results of the testing. The structure of this chapter is as follows; 
section 4.1 describes the metrics which are used to evaluate the matching results. In 
section 4.2, we describe the results of the two approaches for the student data subsets 
used for testing. Section 4.3 contains the comparison of the two approaches. 
4.1 Metrics for Matchings 
We use several metrics to explain and compare the matching results. Those 
metrics are the size of the match (Diebold & Bichler, 2017) and the percentage of dollar 
value spent from the scholarship accounts. 
The first metric is the size of the match. The size of the match represents the 
percentage of scholarships matched to students at the end of the matching process. We 
use two metrics for the size of match. The first one, overall match, calculates the metric 
using the total number of awards that can be allocated. The second metric, qualified 
matches, calculates the metric using the minimum number of qualified students (the 
sum of the minimum value between the number of awards and the number of qualified 
students for each scholarship). 
The formula for the overall match metric is as follow. 





 × 100% 
where |𝑀| is the number of scholarships and students matched, and ui is the number of 
allocated awards for each scholarship si. 
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The formula for qualified matches is as follow. 





 × 100%  
where |𝑀| is the number of scholarship-student matchings, |𝐷𝑖| is the number of 
students who qualify for scholarship si, and ui is the allocated number of award for each 
scholarship si. 
The difference between these two affects the interpretation of the size of the 
matching. We see the difference between them in the result explanation. 
The second metric represents the payout from the scholarship fund. This is 
measured as the percentage of available scholarship funds spent. This metric is 
calculated using two baselines. The first metric, overall payout, is based on the total 
dollar value in the account, whereas the second metric, actual payout, is based on the 
total value of funds that can be spent. 
Payout as measured using the first baseline is as follow. 
 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 =  






 × 100% 
where ai is the amount of award for scholarship si, |𝑀𝑖| is the number of students 
matched to scholarship si, and Ai is the total dollar value in the account of scholarship si. 
Payout as measured using the second baseline is as follow. 
 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 =  






 × 100% 
where ai is the amount of award for scholarship si, |𝑀𝑖| is the number of students 
matched to scholarship si, and ⌊𝐴𝑖⌋ is the total amount of dollar value in the account of 
scholarship si rounded down into the nearest thousand values. 
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4.2 Matching Results 
I describe the results for both approaches in this section. The result for one-sided 
matching is in section 4.2.1, and the result for the two-sided matching is in section 
4.2.2.  
4.2.1 Result of One-Sided Matching 
Table 7 shows the metrics for the one-sided matching result. 









full 95.19 100 87.85 94.49 
sample 1 85.28 100 72.64 78.14 
sample 2 90.39 100 80.17 86.23 
For one-sided matching, the overall match value for the full dataset is 95.19%, 
for sample 1 is 85.28%, and for sample 2 is 90.39%. However, the qualified match 
value for all datasets is 100%. The difference on these two metrics is because for a 
scholarship si, with di allocated award, the number of students who qualified for si is 
less than di. This condition decreases the total number of awards that can be allocated to 
students. The qualified match value shows that the result fulfilled the objective of the 
approach, which is to maximize the number of allocated award received by the students.  
The different values for the overall match between the full dataset and the 
sample (1 and 2) dataset is because of the different number of matches produced for 
each dataset. The full dataset has a higher number of matches than both sample datasets. 
The reason is because there are more qualified students in the full dataset than the 
sample datasets, while the number of allocated awards are the same for all datasets. The 
values of qualified match are the same for all dataset.  
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The overall payout for the full dataset is 87.85%, for sample 1 is 72.64%, and 
for sample 2 is 80.17%. This means that the total value of the awards given to students 
was less than the dollar value of the account. This is partly because of the process of 
rounding down the dollar values in the accounts when the committee calculates the 
amount of funds to be spent for each scholarship. 
The actual payout for the full dataset is 94.49%, for sample 1 is 78.14%, and for 
sample 2 is 86.23%. This again indicates that the total amount of awards was less than 
the funds allocated for the scholarships. This happens because there are scholarships 
where the number of qualified students is less than the number of the allocated awards. 
This condition affects the total amount of award spent. This condition indirectly affects 
the overall payout, because it decreases the total amount of award given to students. 
The ranking process ranks the students based on their GFN and GPA. Figure 13, 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the histogram of one-sided matching results for the 
number of students receiving awards by their GFN for the three datasets. The 




Figure 13: Histogram of GFN for one-sided matching result for full dataset 
 
 




Figure 15: Histogram of GFN for one-sided matching result for sample 2 dataset 
 
 Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the histogram of one-sided matching 
results for the number of students receiving awards by their GPA for the three datasets. 
The histograms of the three datasets are skewed to the right. The effect of filtering the 
data subsets by GPA is clearly shown in Figures 17 and 18 and it is clear that the 
highest GPAs are receiving more scholarships. 
 





Figure 17: Histogram of GPA for one-sided matching result for sample 1 dataset 
 
 
Figure 18: Histogram of GPA for one-sided matching result for sample 2 dataset 
Table 8 provides the summary statistics of GFN for three datasets. 
Table 8: Summary statistics of GFN for one-sided matching result for three 
datasets 
Dataset Min Median Mean Max 
full 2,250 36,608 33,579 44,698 
sample 1 3,144 27,944 28,877 44,663 
sample 2 2,250 26,942 27,026.45 44,517 
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The lowest GFN of the student who receives a scholarship is $2,250 (for full and 
sample 2 datasets) and $3,144 for sample 1 dataset. This can happen when the student 
qualified for a scholarship and there is no other student who qualified for the 
scholarship with higher GFN. The values of maximum GFNs of the student who receive 
a scholarship is the same as the highest value of GFN for each of the dataset. This 
happens because we prioritize student with higher GFN to get the scholarship in the 
ranking process.  
Table 9 provides the summary statistics of GPA for three datasets. 
Table 9: Summary statistics of GPA for one-sided matching result for three 
datasets 
Dataset Min Median Mean Max 
full 0 3.54 3.07 4 
sample 1 2.33 3.54 3.5 4 
sample 2 2.07 3.69 3.59 4 
The lowest GPA of students who can receive a scholarship for the full dataset is 
0. The value of 0 for GPA caused by the missing data values. However, there are 
students with a GPA of 0 who can still get an award because there are several 
scholarships which do not include GPA as a criterion. Given that this is not the desired 
result for the matching, we can remove the students with a GPA of 0 filtering out GPA 
below 2.0. As shown, the minimum GPA values for sample 1 and sample 2 dataset are 
2.33 and 2.07, respectively. 
4.2.2 Result of Two-Sided Matching 
Table 10 shows the metrics for the two-sided matching result. 
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Scholarship-oriented 94.89 99.68 87.37 93.97 
Student-oriented 94.89 99.68 87.37 93.97 
sample 1 
Scholarship-oriented 84.38 98.94 71.52 76.93 
Student-oriented 84.38 98.94 71.52 76.93 
sample 2 
Scholarship-oriented 89.48 99 79.04 85.02 
Student-oriented 89.48 99 79.04 85.02 
For the two-sided approach, both the scholarship-oriented and student-oriented 
methods, the overall match values for each dataset are the same. The overall match for 
the full dataset is 94.89%. However, the qualified match value is 99.68%. The 
difference of these two metrics is because for a scholarship si, with di allocated award, 
the number of students who qualified for si is less than di. This condition decreases the 
total number of awards that can be allocated to students. 
The overall payout, for both scholarship-oriented and student-oriented, is 
87.37% for the full dataset, 71.52% for sample 1, and 79.04% for sample 2. The value 
means that the total amount of awards given to students is less than the dollar value of 
the account. This is partly because of the process of rounding down the dollar values in 
the accounts when the committee calculates the amount of funds to be spent for each 
scholarship. The overall payout for scholarship-oriented and student oriented are the 
same because they both have the same number of scholarship-student match. 
Both the scholarship-oriented and student-oriented methods for each dataset 
yield the same actual payout value. It happens because they both have the same number 
of scholarship-student matches. The actual payout value is 93.37% for the full dataset, 
76.93% for sample 1, and 85.02% for sample 2. This indicates that the total amount of 
awards is less than the funds allocated for the scholarships. This happens because there 
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are scholarships where the number of qualified students is less than the number of the 
allocated awards. This condition affects the total amount of award spent. This condition 
indirectly affects the overall payout, because it decreases the total amount of award 
given to students. 
Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the histogram of GFN for the scholarship-oriented 
and student oriented for the full dataset. The patterns are similar as with the one-sided 
match; students with higher GFN receive more awards regardless of the method. 
 





Figure 20: Histogram of GFN for two-sided student-oriented for full dataset 
 Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the histogram of GFN for the scholarship-oriented 
and student oriented for sample 1 dataset. Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the histogram 
of GFN for the scholarship-oriented and student oriented for sample 2 dataset. The 
histograms of GFN are skewed to the right. The histograms of GFN for scholarship-
oriented and student-oriented for each dataset are identical. 
 
Figure 21: Histogram of GFN for two-sided scholarship-oriented matching for 




Figure 22: Histogram of GFN for two-sided student-oriented matching for sample 
1 dataset 
 
Figure 23: Histogram of GFN for two-sided scholarship-oriented matching for 
sample 2 dataset 
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Figure 24: Histogram of GFN for two-sided student-oriented matching for sample 
2 dataset 
Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the histogram of GPA for the scholarship-oriented 
and student oriented for the full dataset.  
 




Figure 26: Histogram of GPA for two-sided student-oriented matching for full 
dataset 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the histogram of GPA for the scholarship-oriented 
and student oriented for sample 1 dataset.  
 
Figure 27: Histogram of GPA for two-sided scholarship-oriented matching for 
sample 1 dataset 
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Figure 28: Histogram of GPA for two-sided student-oriented matching for sample 
1 dataset 
Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the histogram of GPA for the scholarship-oriented 
and student oriented for sample 2 dataset.  
 
Figure 29: Histogram of GPA for two-sided scholarship-oriented matching for 
sample 2 dataset 
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Figure 30: Histogram of GPA for two-sided student-oriented matching for sample 
2 dataset 
The histograms of GPA are skewed to the right. The histogram of GPA for the 
scholarship-oriented and student-oriented for each dataset are identical. The histogram 
skewed to the right means that the students who received the scholarship are from the 
higher range GPA. 
Table 11 shows the summary statistics for GFN of the two-sided matching result 
for the datasets. The value for each statistic (Min, Median, Mean, Max) for GFN is the 
same between the scholarship-oriented and student-oriented for each dataset. 
Table 11: Summary statistics for GFN of the two-sided matching results 
Dataset Approach Min Median Mean Max 
full 
Scholarship-oriented 2,250 36,636 33,590 44,698 
Student-oriented 2,250 36,636 33,590 44,698 
sample 1 
Scholarship-oriented 3,144 28,209 29,003 44,663 
Student-oriented 3,144 28,209 29,003 44,663 
sample 2 
Scholarship-oriented 2,250 27,050 27,156 44,517 
Student-oriented 2,250 27,051 27,156 44,517 
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 Table 12 shows the summary statistics for GPA of the two-sided matching 
results. The value for each statistic (Min, Median, Mean, Max) for GPA is the same 
between the scholarship-oriented and student-oriented for each dataset. 
Table 12: Summary statistics for GPA of the two-sided matching result 
Dataset Approach Min Median Mean Max 
full 
Scholarship-oriented 0 3.54 3.07 4 
Student-oriented 0 3.54 3.07 4 
sample 1 
Scholarship-oriented 2.33 3.54 3.5 4 
Student-oriented 2.33 3.54 3.5 4 
sample 2 
Scholarship-oriented 2.07 3.7 3.6 4 
Student-oriented 2.07 3.7 3.6 4 
 Based on the metrics, the histograms for GFN and GPA, and the statistics for 
GFN and GPA, we can say that the matching results for scholarship-oriented and 
student-oriented are similar assigned the scholarships to the same subset of students. 
4.3 Comparison 
Table 13 shows the summary of the metrics for all approaches. 











Overall Match (%) 95.19 94.89 94.89 
Qualified Match (%) 100 99.68 99.68 
Overall Payout (%) 87.85 87.37 87.37 
Actual Payout (%) 94.49 93.97 93.97 
sample 
1 
Overall Match (%) 85.28 84.38 84.38 
Qualified Match (%) 100 98.94 98.94 
Overall Payout (%) 72.64 71.52 71.52 
Actual Payout (%) 78.14 76.93 76.93 
sample 
2 
Overall Match (%) 90.39 89.48 89.48 
Qualified Match (%) 100 99 99 
Overall Payout (%) 80.17 79.04 79.04 
Actual Payout (%) 86.23 85.02 85.02 
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 For both metrics, overall match and qualified match, the one-sided matching 
gives a higher number of matches than the other approaches. although, the difference is 
negligible. The difference is because the objective of the one-sided approach is to 
maximize the number of scholarships assigned to students. The same situation also 
happens for the metrics. overall payout and qualified payout. (. The one-sided matching 
gives a higher percentage. This is directly related to the match metrics, because the one-
sided approach produces more matching than the other approaches. 
Table 14 shows the summary statistics of GFN for all the approaches. 
Table 14: Summary statistics of GFN for all approaches 
Dataset Statistic One-sided 
Two-sided 
Scholarship-oriented 
Two-sided              
Student-oriented 
full 
Min 2,250 2,250 2,250 
Median 36,608 36,636 36,636 
Mean 33,579 33,590 33,590 
Max 44,698 44,698 44,698 
sample 1 
Min 3,144 3,144 3,144 
Median 27,944 28,209 28,209 
Mean 28,877 29,003 29,003 
Max 44,663 44,663 44,663 
sample 2 
Min 2,250 2,250 2,250 
Median 26,942 27,051 27,051 
Mean 27,026 27,156 27,156 
Max 44,517 44,517 44,517 
 The differences between the one-sided and two-sided approaches  are only for 
the median and mean values. The differences are very small and are a function of the 
random selection of the two subsets. 
 Table 15 shows the summary statistics of GPA for all the approaches. The 
statistics of the GPA for all approaches have similar value. 
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Table 15: Summary statistics of GPA for all approaches 
Dataset Statistic One-sided 
Two-sided 
Scholarship-oriented 
Two-sided              
Student-oriented 
full 
Min 0 0 0 
Median 3.54 3.54 3.54 
Mean 3.07 3.07 3.07 
Max 4 4 4 
sample 1 
Min 2.33 2.33 2.33 
Median 3.54 3.54 3.54 
Mean 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Max 4 4 4 
sample 2 
Min 2.07 2.07 0.12 
Median 3.70 3.71 3.71 
Mean 3.60 3.61 3.61 
Max 4 4 4 
Appendix C, D, and E show the total and average amount of awards based on the 
category of GFN and GPA for the full and sample datasets, respectively. Appendix F 
and G show the number of awards for n-rank students, and the number of students who 
received n-rank scholarship, both with the full dataset, respectively. From the 
appendices, we can see that the number of awards given to students with certain rank 
are varied. The variations are hard to be seen in the higher rank. It happens after the 30th 
rank. These variations make the assignment of scholarships to students different for 
each approach. 
Based on the two metrics and the statistics of GFN and GPA, we can say that 
there is not much of a difference between the approaches. Although, based on the 
metrics, one-sided approach gives a slightly better result. However, it should be noted 
that the slight difference in here is equal to a student who does not get assigned a 
scholarship in the two-sided approach. 
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4.4 Application 
 I developed an application for the two approaches to facilitate use by the 
scholarship committee. The application is developed in Python with a web interface. 
Figures 31, 32, and 33 show the example of the web interface for the initial matching, 
one-sided matching, and two-sided matching respectively. The committee can use this 
application to perform the matching process. The result of the matching process is 
displayed on the interface. The result then can be saved in an Excel file. An example of 
the result from one-sided matching process which is saved in an Excel file can be seen 
in Appendix H. The committee can use the matching result to assign the scholarships to 
the students. 
 








Figure 33: Interface for two-sided matching 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this thesis, I propose two approaches to optimize the scholarship-student 
matching process for GCoE. Those approaches are one-sided matching, based on the 
ranking of students who met the requirements for each scholarship, and two-sided 
matching, which maximizes the value of award the students can get. The approaches are 
applied to an actual dataset of scholarships and students. 
The results show that the approaches produce viable scholarship-student 
matching sets. The matching assigned the scholarships to students. The one-sided 
approach is slightly better than the two-sided approach because it assigns all the 
allocated award to eligible students. 
There are several areas in which this work can be extended, which include 
assigning a different award amount for a scholarship, applying different ranking 
methods, and including several attributes of the scholarships which are excluded in this 
work. These recommendations are based on the assumptions and limitations of this 
work.  
This work uses the assumption that the amount of award given to students for a 
particular scholarship is the same between all the students who are assigned to that 
particular scholarship. It can be improved by allowing different students to receive a 
different award amounts based on criteria specified by the committee member. This 
improvement will help the committee to tailor the amount of award based on the 
individual financial need of the students, which will make the students receive the 
amount of award closer to the value of their financial need. 
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The current ranking process for students is based on two attributes, Gross 
Financial Need (GFN) and Grade Point Average (GPA). This ranking concept needs to 
be re-examined, whether this is the best combination of attributes to rank the students or 
if there can be other combinations which will rank the students in a better way. 
The current ranking process for scholarships is based on the priority set by the 
committee, the amount of award, and the number of awards, and a tie-breaker. Similarly 
with the ranking concept for the students, the ranking process for the scholarships needs 
to be re-examined to determine whether this ranking process is the best way. It needs to 
be evaluated to see if there can be another way to rank the scholarships or if it would be 
better not to rank the scholarships. 
The current ranking process for both the scholarship and the students is strictly 
ordered. It can be improved by allowing ties in the ranking process so that the students 
with the similar qualification have the same chance to be assigned to a scholarship, not 
dependent on a random tie breaking. 
This work excludes several attributes from the scholarship matching process. It 
can be improved by including those excluded attributes. To include those attributes, 
several methods have to be developed to extract the value for those attributes from 
student data. For example, there is an attribute for organization activity. To determine 
student participation in an organization, we need to extract that information from the 
student’s essay. It can be achieved by developing a method using text analytics. 
In conclusion, scholarship-student matching can be optimized with these two 
approaches. This optimized process helps the committee of the scholarships in term of 
reducing the time to work on the matching process. I would recommend the one-sided 
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approach to optimize the matching process because it can allocate the possible 
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Appendix A: List of scholarship and student attributes  









8 US Resident 
9 State Resident 
10 County Resident 
11 City Resident 
12 Financial Need 
13 Citizenship 
14 High School Name 
15 High School State 
16 High School City 













Appendix B: List of excluded attributes 
The list of excluded attributes for this research are on the following table. 
Number Attributes 
1 High SAT/ACT score 
2 Active in campus organization 
3 Active in extracurricular activities 
4 Married 
5 Total family income of less than 50K/year 
6 Demonstrated leadership 
7 Rural Oklahoma 
8 Hometown Population 25K or less 
9 Rank in top 25% 
10 Participating in 1 or more varsity athletic activity, must not be 
recipient of full athletic scholarship at OU 
11 Student Athlete who have earned the varsity letter "O" 
12 Pursuing a career in the areas of natural gas, natural gas liquids, 
other gaseous fuels, and feedstocks 
13 Oklahoma high school considered to be small 
14 Grandchildren of immigrant who are US citizens, first generation to 
attend college 













Appendix C: Total amount of awards and average amount of awards 
based on the category of GFN and GPA for full dataset 
GFN GPA 


















3-4 211,000 222,000 222,000 1,455 1,520 1,520 
2-2.99 14,000 16,000 16,000 1,400 1,600 1,600 
1-1.99 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 




3-4 126,000 102,000 102,000 1,968 1,700 1,700 
2-2.99 4,000 5,000 5,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 




3-4 68,000 68,000 68,000 2,833 2,833 2,833 
2-2.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,001 - 
15,000 
3-4 62,000 62,000 62,000 2,818 2,818 2,818 
2-2.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 - 
5,000 
3-4 15,000 15,000 15,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
2-2.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 









Appendix D: Total amount of awards and average amount of awards 
based on the category of GFN and GPA for sample 1 dataset 
GFN GPA 


















3-4 128,000 170,000 170,000 1,523 2,023 2,023 
2-2.99 6,000 6,000 6,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 




3-4 115,000 103,000 103,000 1,493 1,337 1,337 
2-2.99 21,000 13,000 13,000 1,615 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 




3-4 132,000 102,000 102,000 1,692 1,378 1,378 
2-2.99 11,000 13,000 13,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,001 - 
15,000 
3-4 37,000 37,000 37,000 2,846 2,846 2,846 
2-2.99 1,000 0 0 1,000 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 - 
5,000 
3-4 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
2-2.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 









Appendix E: Total amount of awards and average amount of awards 
based on the category of GFN and GPA for sample 2 dataset 
GFN GPA 


















3-4 124,000 146,000 146,000 1,771 2,085 2,085 
2-2.99 10,000 14,000 14,000 1,666 2,333 2,333 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 




3-4 134,000 130,000 130,000 1,425 1,382 1,382 
2-2.99 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 




3-4 146,000 127,000 127,000 1,586 1,395 1,395 
2-2.99 10,000 10,000 10,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,001 - 
15,000 
3-4 59,000 53,000 53,000 2,809 2,523 2,523 
2-2.99 4,000 0 0 2,000 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 - 
5,000 
3-4 12,000 12,000 12,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
2-2.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-1.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 









Appendix F: The number of awards given to n-rank students for the 



















1 80 16 16  44 5     
2 1 76 76  49 1     
3 2      50 3     
4 6 2 2  51 1 4   
6 1      52 1     
7 3 11 11  53 1     
8 3      54 12     
12 3      56 1     
13 2 1 1  57 1     
15 2 1 1  58 1 7   
16 1 1 1  59 2     
17 3 1 1  61 7     
18 6 2 2  62 2     
20 1      63 3     
21 2      65 1 4   
22 2 2 2  66 2     
23 1 1 1  69 1   4 
24 2 3 3  70 3     
25 3 1 1  71     7 
26 6 6 6  73 1     
27   3 3  74 1     
28 2 31 31  76 1     
29 7 5 5  77 1     
30 4 25 25  78 5   4 
32 1 20 20  79 3     
33 3      81 5     
34 2      82 7     
35 1      83 2     
36 4      85 4     
37 2      87 1     
40 1      88 2     
42 4      89 1 1 1 






















91 3      130   1 1 
92 3 1 1  131 1   4 
93 1 2 2  132 3   2 
94 1      134 1     
95 4      135 2     
96 2      136 2 1   
99 2      137 1 2   
100 1      138   4 1 
101 1 1    139 1     
102 1 4 1  140 1 1   
103 2 1 1  141 2 3 1 
104 2 1 1  142 1     
106   1 1  143 1 1 3 
107 5 2 2  144   1   
108 5 1 1  145 1     
109   1 1  146 1 1   
110 1 1 1  147   3 1 
111 1 1 1  148 1 9   
112   1 1  149   2   
113 2 1 1  150   13   
114 1 1 1  153 1     
115   1 1  158   1 1 
116 1      159   1 1 
118 1 1 1  161   1 1 
119   1 1  168   2 2 
120 1      169 1     
122 1      174   1 1 
124 1      176   1 3 
125 4      179   1 2 
126 1      182   1   
127   3 3  185   2   
128 1   19  187   3 1 













193   1 2 
194     2 
205   1 1 
206   1 1 
221   1 1 
224   1 1 
228   1 1 




Appendix G: The number of students who received n-rank scholarship 





















1 14 14 14 
 
19 4 1 1 
2 146 146 146 
 
20 3 2 2 
3 50 45 47 
 
21 2 2 2 
4 11 12 7 
 
22 3 2 2 
5 14 18 20 
 
23   1 1 
6 16 17 15 
 
24 2 5 5 
7 10 3 9 
 
25 2 2 2 
8 1 6 4 
 
26 1   1 
9 4 6 5 
 
27 2   1 
10 4 4 3 
 
28 1   1 
11 3 5 6 
 
29 2   1 
12 4 4 4 
 
30   1   
13 4 2 2 
 
32 1 1   
14 3 4 4 
 
33   1   
15 1 1 1 
 
35   1   
16 4 2 2 
 
38 1     
17 2 5 5 
 
39 1     
18 1 3 3 





Appendix H: An example of the matching result 
 
Scholarship Account Scholarship Name Student ID Student Name
31786 Scholarship 31786 908 Student 908
31786 Scholarship 31786 006 Student 006
31786 Scholarship 31786 024 Student 024
31786 Scholarship 31786 736 Student 736
31786 Scholarship 31786 737 Student 737
31786 Scholarship 31786 639 Student 639
31786 Scholarship 31786 751 Student 751
31786 Scholarship 31786 758 Student 758
31786 Scholarship 31786 257 Student 257
31786 Scholarship 31786 764 Student 764
31786 Scholarship 31786 597 Student 597
31786 Scholarship 31786 538 Student 538
31786 Scholarship 31786 290 Student 290
31786 Scholarship 31786 845 Student 845
31786 Scholarship 31786 334 Student 334
31786 Scholarship 31786 277 Student 277
31786 Scholarship 31786 215 Student 215
31786 Scholarship 31786 214 Student 214
31786 Scholarship 31786 554 Student 554
31786 Scholarship 31786 039 Student 039
31786 Scholarship 31786 917 Student 917
31786 Scholarship 31786 739 Student 739
31786 Scholarship 31786 579 Student 579
31786 Scholarship 31786 318 Student 318
31786 Scholarship 31786 603 Student 603
31786 Scholarship 31786 761 Student 761
31786 Scholarship 31786 577 Student 577
31786 Scholarship 31786 875 Student 875
31786 Scholarship 31786 139 Student 139
31786 Scholarship 31786 745 Student 745
31786 Scholarship 31786 576 Student 576
31786 Scholarship 31786 100 Student 100
31812 Scholarship 31812 052 Student 052
31812 Scholarship 31812 867 Student 867
31812 Scholarship 31812 141 Student 141
31812 Scholarship 31812 783 Student 783
31812 Scholarship 31812 176 Student 176
31812 Scholarship 31812 584 Student 584
